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SURVIVING CASTLE ROCK: THE HUMAN RIGHTS
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
MAX D. SIEGEL1
INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 1999, the police department of Castle Rock, Colorado repeatedly
dismissed Jessica Gonzalez’ cries for help after her estranged, abusive husband
abducted their three young daughters from her front yard.2 In so doing, law
enforcement ignored a permanent restraining order Jessica had taken against her
estranged husband explicitly stating on the back of the order that law enforcement
“shall” enforce its terms using “every reasonable means” and arrest or seek an
arrest warrant following any attempted or actual violation.3 Within ten hours of
learning of her daughters’ disappearance, Jessica called and met with law
enforcement nine times, but police refused to enforce the order.4 Again and again,
law enforcement instructed Jessica to wait and see and then check back with them
hours later, neglecting to take any action when Jessica filed a report at the station;
in fact, they never dispatched any officer even after promising that they would take
action.5 While Jessica feared for her daughters’ lives, law enforcement took dinner
breaks, searched for a lost dog, and sent three officers to investigate a routine traffic
stop.6 Ultimately, despite Jessica’s numerous requests for help and personal
attempts to find her daughters by phone and by going to her estranged husband’s
apartment, and without law enforcement making any reasonable effort to enforce

1 J.D. expected May 2012, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. I am
grateful to Professor Leslie Meltzer Henry and Judge Videtta A. Brown for their support. I found great
motivation for this Article in observing the staff of the Sexual Assault Legal Institute and the House of
Ruth Domestic Violence Legal Clinic work tirelessly to ensure abuse survivors’ health and safety.
2 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 753 (2005).
3 Id. at 752. The preprinted notice to law enforcement officials on the back of the restraining order
read:

[Y]ou shall use every reasonable means to enforce this restraining order. You shall
arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for
the arrest of the restrained person when you have information amounting to probable
cause that the restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of this
order and the restrained person has been properly served with a copy of this order or has
received actual notice of the existence of this order. Id.
4 Testimony of Jessica Lenahan, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (Oct. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.chrgj.org/events/docs/Jessica%20Testimony%20FINAL%20for%20posting.pdf.
5 Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 753-54.
6 Testimony of Jessica Lenahan, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (Oct. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.chrgj.org/events/docs/Jessica%20Testimony%20FINAL%20for%20posting.pdf.
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the order or locate the children, Jessica’s estranged husband opened fire on the
Castle Rock Police Station.7 Law enforcement shot back, killing him, before
finding Jessica’s three children dead in the back of their father’s truck.8 Law
enforcement then detained and interrogated Jessica for twelve hours.9 Jessica was
never allowed to identify the bodies of her children, and she still does not know
whether it was the police or her estranged husband that fired the shots that killed
her three girls.10
Subsequently, Jessica brought suit against Castle Rock, asserting that by
failing to enforce the restraining order, the police department had violated her
constitutional rights.11 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
sided with Jessica in her action against the State and found that she had a protected
property interest that law enforcement had violated without adequate procedural
due process.12 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that
Jessica did not have a constitutional right to police enforcement of the order
because Colorado law did not create a personal entitlement to enforcement13 and
that even if it did create such an entitlement, it would not constitute a property
interest warranting due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.14
The Court’s opinion invoked earlier decisions in which it had refused to impose
affirmative duties on the government,15 fortifying a deeply ingrained
conceptualization of the Constitution of the United States as a “Negative
Constitution” that creates a government with restraints on its actions but extremely
limited responsibilities to its citizens.16

7

Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 753-54.
Id.
9 Testimony of Jessica Lenahan, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (Oct. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.chrgj.org/events/docs/Jessica%20Testimony%20FINAL%20for%20posting.pdf.
10 Id.
11 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 750-51 (2005).
12 Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1101, 1117 (10th Cir. 2004) rev’d sub nom.
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
13 Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 766.
14 Id. at 766-69.
15 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989) (holding
that state social service workers’ failure to remove a repeatedly beaten boy from his abusive father’s
custody did not deprive the boy of his liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 510-11 (1989) (finding that a statute
prohibiting the use of public funds and facilities to encourage or counsel a woman to have a
nontherapeutic abortion was constitutional because states do not have an affirmative duty to provide
access to abortion-related services). But see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (holding that
prison officials have an affirmative duty under the Eighth Amendment to foster humane conditions and
that officials face liability if they fail to protect detainees from violence when they knew about a
substantial risk of serious harm).
16 See, e.g., Jenna MacNaughton, Comment, Positive Rights in Constitutional Law: No Need to
Graft, Best Not to Prune, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 750, 750 (2001) (explaining that “judges have dismissed
any claim that citizens have any positive rights to government services; that is, any claim that the federal
government has an affirmative duty to ensure that its citizens can actually enjoy their constitutional
liberties”).
8
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After exhausting her domestic remedies, Jessica petitioned the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights to review her case. The Commission
approved Jessica’s petition on October 7, 2008.17 Jessica alleged that law
enforcement did not adequately respond to her pleas for assistance and that the
State never properly investigated the deaths of her three daughters, whose time,
place, and cause of death are still unknown.18 On August 17, 2011, the
Commission ruled that the United States had violated Jessica’s human rights as
well as the rights of other abuse survivors throughout the country. The
Commission’s report declared that the United States had continuously failed to
fulfill its legal obligation to protect individuals like Jessica from domestic violence,
and set forth recommendations to guide the country into compliance with
international law.19 The immediate impact of the report is largely symbolic, as the
proceedings before the Commission allowed Jessica to tell her story and realize a
sense of justice she did not experience in the American system.20 The report’s
most concrete consequence, however, is that the Commission will continue to
monitor the United States and release follow up reports about the country’s
progress.21 Nevertheless, the Commission’s findings draw attention to the stark
contrast between the American response to domestic violence and international
standards, providing an opportunity for reflection and valuable leverage to
advocates for reform.22
Accordingly, this Article will view the Commission’s report through the lens
of the United States’ Negative Constitution and examine the source of the country’s
incapacity to meet international standards for human rights. Part I will explain the
global legal framework for the Commission and its findings before placing the
United States’ mechanisms for protecting survivors in the context of the Negative
Constitution, which exacerbates the vulnerability of underprivileged populations
and ensures ongoing social inequality.23 Part II will describe the potential for

17

Gonzales v. U.S., Petition 1490-05, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 52/07 (2007).
Lenahan (Gonzales) v. U.S., Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/11 (2011)
[hereinafter Report]. While autopsy reports on the children show that they died due to gunshot wounds
to the head, when they were shot and whether the bullets originated from the police during the shootout,
their father, or someone else remain unknown. Id. at 22-23.
19 Id. at 56-57.
20 See Lenora M. Lapidus, The Role of International Bodies in Influencing U.S. Policy to End
Violence Against Women, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 538 (2008) (explaining that communication with
international bodies gave Jessica “some sense of justice” and “provided her with an opportunity to push
the United States to answer for its failures, rather than having the issue simply end with the Supreme
Court’s ruling dismissing her lawsuit.”).
21 Report, supra note 18, at 57 (“The Inter-American Commission, according to the norms
contained in the instruments which govern its mandate, will continue evaluating the measures adopted
by the United States with respect to the above recommendations until it determines there has been full
compliance.”).
22 See Lapidus, supra note 20, at 538 (observing that international human rights mechanisms
cannot force a country’s compliance, but that reports on a country’s compliance “shine a spotlight on
human rights abuses and can shame a country into altering its practices”).
23 See discussion infra Part I.B.
18
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American courts to incorporate international standards into legal proceedings and
assert that respect for outside sources of law accords with both contemporary
developments and history.24 Finally, this Article will argue that a wholesale
abdication of negative constitutionalism is necessary to protect the United States
against the widely borne economic ramifications of domestic violence, the
reputational costs of the nation’s failure to participate in the global effort to aid
survivors of abuse, and the depreciation of its expressive value as a country with an
abysmal legacy of State-sanctioned violence against women.25
I.

INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN STANDARDS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Legal reactions to domestic violence vary distinctly between the international
and national levels. Global actors like the Organization of American States have
recognized a uniform responsibility for government to take affirmative measures in
its response to domestic violence, including the exercise of due diligence by the
United States.26 Yet, the Supreme Court has demanded state statutory enactments
to achieve government support for survivors while neglecting impediments to
implementation and relegating survivors’ lives to unlikely protections.27
A. The Global Laws of Affirmative Measures and Due Diligence
The Commission’s report on Jessica’s case emerged from a long tradition of
international laws that have strongly favored the intrinsic rights of abuse survivors.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, created by a Commission on
Human Rights that was newly formed in the wake of the Holocaust, has served as
the foundational document for both the United Nations and international human
rights.28 Today, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remains the most
important source of protection for human rights,29 recognizing that they are
inherent to individuals rather than conferred by a sovereign government onto its
people.30 Additional international human rights laws arise from various other
treaties, resolutions, and conventions that States have passed.31 The Inter24

See discussion infra Part II.A.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
26 See discussion infra Part I.A.
27 See discussion infra Part I.B.
28 See Lapidus, supra note 20, at 535-36 (describing the significance and formation of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
29 See HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 120
(1996) (“[The United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948] is the parent document,
the initial burst of enthusiasm and idealism, terser, more general and grander than the treaties, in some
sense the constitution of the entire movement—the single most invoked human rights instrument.”).
30 See Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1153, 1164 (1998) (stating that human dignity is “inherent” in the United Nation’s Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and that “dignity and rights are ‘recognized,’ not conferred”).
31 See Lapidus, supra note 20, at 535 (“The universal system for the protection of human rights has
two dimensions: U.N. Charter-based bodies for the protection of human rights and international treatybased bodies for the protection of human rights.”).
25
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American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence
against Women is particularly relevant to contemporary international domestic
violence law and policy, and it provides that every woman has the right to be free
from violence, the State shall exercise due diligence in its response to violence
against women, and any person or group may petition the Commission to review a
State’s noncompliance with its measures.32
Global enforcement entities administer justice regionally and based on the
extent to which each State has institutionalized these standards. While statutory
and constitutional law is a democratic manifestation of majority values,
international law is administered by supranational entities of less conventional
legitimacy.33 Particularly relevant to Jessica’s case, the Commission supervises
human rights in the member states of the Organization of American States (OAS)34
and, in conjunction with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, investigates
complaints and makes recommendations concerning human rights.35 The
Commission has treated the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man36 as binding on OAS member states that have not ratified the American
Convention on Human Rights, including the United States.37 According to the
Commission, the United States is bound as a matter of law to take affirmative
measures to give effect to the rights contained in the Declaration.38
After years of correspondence, briefs, and hearings, the Commission ruled in
Jessica’s favor, holding that the State had deprived her of equal protection, failed to
take reasonable measures to protect its citizens, and provided an inadequate
response to private violence. First, the Commission found that the United States
had violated Article II39 of the Declaration by failing to protect Jessica and her
32 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534.
33 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER 273 (2011) (describing
legislatures, executives, and constitutions as democratically legitimated at varying degrees of collective
consent and acknowledging “supranational legal bodies like the European Court of Human Rights or the
International Criminal Court, whose basis of legitimacy is much murkier than those of national-level
courts”).
34 The OAS is an agent of the United Nations that fosters cooperation and integration among its
members in a hemispheric inter-state society. BETTY HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES: A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL GOVERNANCE
23 (2011).
35 See Cecilia Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 439, 439 (1990).
36 Ninth International Conference of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, Apr. 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948) [hereinafter Declaration].
37 See S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 33, 41 (2001) (explaining that the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man is the
principal instrument for determining applicable substantive rights for countries in proceedings before the
Commission that are not parties to the American Convention on Human Rights).
38 Report, supra note 18, at 32-33.
39 “All persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties established in this
Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or any other factor.” Declaration, supra
note 36, art. II.
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three daughters from domestic violence.40 The Commission echoed international
and regional systems, announcing that a State’s “failure to act with due diligence”
to prevent domestic violence constitutes discrimination and denies women equality
before the law.41 Second, the Commission found that the United States had
violated Article I42 and Article VII43 of the Declaration because it did not take
reasonable measures to protect Jessica’s children’s lives.44 A person’s right to
life45 is the most fundamental human right, and the Commission considered
measures to protect the right to life like enforcement of restraining orders critically
important for vulnerable populations—especially young girls.46 Finally, the
Commission found that the United States had violated articles V47 and VI,48 which
pertained to Jessica’s right to judicial protection.49 Specifically, the United States
violated Jessica’s right to judicial protection50 when it did not enforce the
restraining order51 and when it failed to adequately investigate and provide access
to information about the deaths of Jessica’s children.52
The report’s findings and aspirations extended far beyond Jessica’s
circumstances. The Commission acknowledged that Jessica’s case was one of
several instances of the United States having violated citizens’ human rights by
failing to take reasonable measures to address domestic violence.53 The
Commission specified that the report’s conclusions were tailored to the question of
whether Jessica had the opportunity to present her claims and be heard and also that
“it is not the formal existence of judicial remedies that demonstrates due diligence,
but rather that they are available and effective.”54 Thus, while the report focused
on Jessica’s case,55 its recommendations encompassed the entire national response
to domestic violence.56
40

Report, supra note 18, at 2.
Id. at 30.
42 “Every human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person.” Declaration,
supra note 36, art. I.
43 “All women, during pregnancy and the nursing period, and all children have the right to special
protection, care and aid.” Declaration, supra note 36, art. VII.
44 Report, supra note 18, at 2.
45 In the international context, a right to life refers to the right of a human being to live and does not
connote opposition to reproductive choice. Id. at 30-31.
46 Id. at 31.
47 “Every person has the right to the protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his honor,
his reputation, and his private and family life.” Declaration, supra note 36, art. V.
48 “Every person has the right to establish a family, the basic element of society, and to receive
protection therefor.” Id. at art. VI.
49 Report, supra note 18, at 2.
50 Id. at 53.
51 Id. at 47.
52 Id. at 48.
53 Id. at 37-38.
54 Id. at 46.
55 The Commission’s recommendations to specifically address Jessica’s case were for the State to
investigate the cause, time, and place of her daughters’ deaths, investigate the systemic failures that
contributed to the unenforced restraining order, and offer full reparations to Jessica and her next-of-kin.
41
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The Commission’s report signaled the systematic failures of the United States
to realize widely accepted international standards for human rights, particularly
considering that due diligence is a longstanding requirement of State responsibility
in the prevention and punishment of violent acts.57 Moreover, the report pointed to
various international instruments to show the existence of a global consensus that
states have an obligation to exercise due diligence in response to the problem of
violence against women.58 The report offered four principles highlighted by
current law and practice: the State may incur international responsibility if it fails to
act with due diligence to address violence against women; international consensus
“underscore[s] the link between discrimination, violence against women, and due
diligence; due diligence includes adequate judicial remedies for victims; and the
State must consider factors like age and minority status that could place individuals
at heightened vulnerability for victimization.59
The report addressed the United States’ response both in terms of law
enforcement and the law itself. First, it detailed standards for law enforcement’s
reaction to abusers’ potential violations of restraining orders and made
recommendations to better protect the human rights of survivors.60 Unlike the
steps taken by the officers in Jessica’s case, minimum standards for officers are that
they read an order in its entirety to determine whether it has been violated, verify
the existence of an order even when its holder does not have a copy, and attempt to
locate the abuser in violation of an order and seize his or her firearms.61 An
adequate response requires defined protocol,62 and law enforcement should be
trained in the complex problem of domestic violence63 and be able to determine the
risks of a particular violation by weighing situational factors, including an
aggressor’s access to weapons, threats of suicide, and history of violence.64
Turning to the judiciary, the report described the pressing need for
multifaceted legal reforms across the country. The Commission acknowledged that
as a result of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Castle Rock v. Gonzales,65
Id. at 56.
56 Id. at 56-57.
57 See generally Jan Arno Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution
and Due Diligence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 265 (2004).
58 Report, supra note 18, at 34. These instruments included General Assembly resolutions, widely
approved declarations and platforms, treaties, and the jurisprudence of universal and regional legal
systems. Id. See also Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence
as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 292-95 (1994) (discussing the emergence of the belief
that violence against women is a matter of human rights).
59 Report, supra note 18, at 35-36.
60 Id. at 40.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 41.
64 Id. at 40.
65 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (highlighting police discretion in the
enforcement of restraining orders and holding that a domestic violence survivor did not have a right
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforcement of an order).
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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,66 and United
States v. Morrison,67 the United States might have improperly narrowed the
remedies available to domestic violence survivors in legal proceedings against
government officials.68 While legislative developments like the Violence Against
Women Act of 199469 are positive, the Supreme Court has left victims of domestic
violence with no constitutional or federal statutory remedy when police are grossly
negligent in the execution of their duty to protect an individual’s physical
security.70 Therefore, the Commission called for new policies and legal
approaches that would mandate enforcement of precautionary measures to benefit
survivors, better protect children, and help to restructure discriminatory
sociocultural patterns that compromise survivors’ safety by impeding the American
response to domestic violence.71
B. American Constitutionalism’s Astonishing Disregard for Human Consequences
The Commission called for sweeping legal reforms in a country preoccupied
with a conceptualization of law that is antithetical to basic principles of human
rights. In stark contrast to international standards, the United States’ domestic
violence interventions are limited to political processes and subsequent judicial
review because citizens do not have a constitutionally guaranteed right to
government assistance to meet their most basic needs.72
Generally, the
Constitution limits and empowers government, and it does not create positive rights
such as those advocated in the report and widely accepted elsewhere in the world.73
The Supreme Court has espoused negative constitutionalism irrespective of
the gravity of the human indignity at stake. In his 1989 majority opinion for the
child abuse case DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
66 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that
government obligations generally arise only through political processes and that state social service
workers had no constitutional duty to protect a repeatedly beaten boy after numerous reports of abuse
even when the abuse left the boy severely mentally disabled).
67 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (finding that Congress lacked authority under
either the Commerce Clause of Article I or the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a nationwide civil cause
of action for survivors of gender-motivated violence after a student was assaulted and raped by two men;
the student brought suit against the perpetrators and their university).
68 Report, supra note 18, at 54-55.
69 Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001-03, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55
(1994) (codified as amended in scattered Sections of 8, 16, 18, and 42 U.S.C.).
70 See Report, supra note 18, at 55.
71 Id. at 56.
72 See Lapidus, supra note 20, at 549 (explaining that major differences between international law
in comparison to the Constitution of the United States include the State’s “affirmative obligation to
provide protection from harm” and not merely preclude itself from causing harm and the obligation to
act with due diligence to protect individuals from third parties).
73 See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative
Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 409–10 (1990) (discussing how the judiciary’s
refusal to impose affirmative duties on the State, such as the duty to protect against private violence or
to assist women in receiving abortions, reinforces the general notion that the Constitution of the United
States only requires the government to refrain from certain actions).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that government obligations could arise from
political processes but not from the Constitution.74 The Court held that even when
a father beat his child repeatedly and to the point of lifelong mental impairment,75
and regardless of whether the county’s department of social services had definitive
knowledge of the abuse and did not act to remove the child over the course of
years,76 the State did not have a constitutional obligation to protect the child from
private violence.77 In DeShaney, the Court explained that the State’s failure to act
did not deprive the child of his liberty without due process of the law and thus did
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.78 The Due
Process Clause cannot create a government obligation “even where such aid may be
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself
may not deprive the individual.”79
Later in the same term as DeShaney, Chief Justice Rehnquist again evoked
the Negative Constitution in another majority opinion and emphasized that the
State did not violate the Constitution even when government action to dictate later
inaction would inevitably deprive an individual of a constitutionally protected right.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services involved a Missouri law that restricted
access to abortion through multiple controversial measures, including prohibitions
against the use of public facilities for abortions, public employees’ performance of
abortion services, and public funding of abortion counseling.80 In upholding the
statute, the Court found it insignificant that in the absence of public facilities,
employees, and funds, an indigent woman could not otherwise access abortion
services—even if the abortion was medically necessary.81 According to the Court,
the Missouri Act withstood a constitutional challenge because “Missouri’s refusal
to allow public employees to perform abortions in public hospitals leaves a
pregnant woman with the same choices as if the State had chosen not to operate any
public hospitals at all.”82
In addition to the State’s limited obligation to act, it has tremendous power
should it choose to wield it, including the power to infringe on the fundamental
rights of individuals. This power was articulated early in the twentieth century in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,83 in which the Court upheld a Massachusetts statute
that mandated vaccination against smallpox after a citizen who had refused
vaccination or to pay the monetary penalty associated with his refusal faced

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989).
Id. at 191, 193.
Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 200, 203.
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 196.
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 504 (1989)
Id. at 509.
Id.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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criminal penalties.84 The Court weighed the individual’s interest in bodily integrity
against the community’s interest in safety and found that the law was justified to
protect the public health.85 The Court proclaimed that the interests of the
individual could not subjugate the health and safety of the community,86 explaining
that “liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within
its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times
and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.”87 According to the Court,
the State had expansive power to promote its policy interest in maintaining a safe,
ordered society, and the State’s interest was fundamentally superior as a matter of
law to the individual’s interest in his or her constitutional rights.88
The Supreme Court has found narrow exceptions to the Negative
Constitution and, on rare occasions, found State inaction unconstitutional.
Specifically, a citizen may possess positive rights to government action in contexts
such as state-imposed detention, at which point the government’s obligation to the
individual emanates “from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to
act on his own behalf” rather than “the State’s knowledge of the individual’s
predicament.”89 For example, in Farmer v. Brennan,90 the Court held that prison
officials who exhibited deliberate indifference to a transsexual inmate’s safety91
could be liable under the Eighth Amendment if they exposed the inmate to a
substantial risk of serious harm while possessing knowledge of the risk and failing
to take reasonable measures to abate it.92 Yet, the outcomes in other cases when
the State had not already in some way limited individual action contrast sharply
with the Court’s holding in Brennan despite the vital interests at stake: even when
the Court had admitted that access to services cut to the core of “the very means to
subsist—food, shelter, and other necessities,” the Court did not admit a positive
right to welfare or that the State possessed a constitutional obligation to act.93
Accordingly, even when the judiciary has occasionally recognized the State’s
affirmative duty to preserve its citizens’ rights, the bench has demonstrated a high
tolerance for human suffering. A recent example arose in May 2011 when the
Supreme Court decided Brown v. Plata94 and upheld a California federal district
court’s mandate to limit prison populations to remedy violations of the Eighth

84

Id. at 12.
Id. at 26.
86 Id. at 26-27.
87 Id. at 26.
88 Id. at 29.
89 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t. of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989).
90 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
91 Id. at 829.
92 Id. at 847.
93 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974).
94 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
85
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Amendment due to overcrowding.95 The Court described evidence of suicidal
inmates held for extended periods in telephone booth-sized cages without toilets,
and it focused on one particular inmate, nearly catatonic and standing in a pool of
his own urine, held in such a cage for nearly twenty-four hours.96 Similarly, the
Court observed that numerous prisoners experienced prolonged illness, unnecessary
pain, and preventable death.97 Moreover, the Court’s decision to uphold the
California district court’s order sprang from the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995,98 through which Congress created detailed protocol for reducing prison
populations in compliance with the Eighth Amendment.99 Justice Scalia, who
delivered the opinion of the Court in Gonzalez v. Castle Rock,100 argued in Plata’s
dissent that the majority had decided to uphold “the most radical injunction issued
by a court in our Nation’s history” and that this was “a case whose proper outcome
is so clearly indicated by tradition and common sense . . . [t]he proceedings that led
to this result were a judicial travesty.”101
Similar to Plata, Justice Scalia exhibited indifference toward human
consequences when he acknowledged Castle Rock’s “horrible facts” at the outset of
his opinion and never again alluded to Jessica’s personal tragedy or the lifethreatening ramifications of the Court’s decision.102 A judicially unrecognized
outcome of Castle Rock is that it compromised the safety of survivors in the thirtytwo jurisdictions that had mandatory arrest provisions for violations of restraining
orders.103 Domestic violence advocates had not found these mandatory arrest
measures easily won.104 By declining to recognize mandatory arrest provisions,
the Court simultaneously ignored and voided the accountability and security that
sparked the early movement to improve the American response to domestic
violence, recalling a recent time in the country’s history when men could violate
and beat their wives without legal consequence.105
95

Id. at 1923.
Id. at 1924.
97 Id. at 1925-26.
98 Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, §§ 801-810 (1996).
99 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929-47 (detailing the statutorily predetermined judicial process for reducing
prison populations in the Prison Litigation Reform Act and concluding that the order of the California
District Court was in compliance with the law).
100 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 750 (2005).
101 Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102 Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 751 (“The horrible facts of this case are contained in the
complaint that respondent Jessica Gonzalez filed in Federal District Court.”).
103 See G. Kristian Miccio, The Death of the Fourteenth Amendment: Castle Rock and Its Progeny,
17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 277, 289 (2011) (“In what I term the ‘yeah, but’ theory of
constitutional analysis, the Court dismissed not only Jessica’s claim, but also implicitly the claim of
anyone in any of the thirty-two jurisdictions where mandatory arrest provisions exist.”).
104 See G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 239-40 (2005) (observing
that the road to mandatory arrest in cases of violence against women “was both long and arduous for
battered women’s advocates”).
105 Id. at 250-51 (asserting that state interventions through mandatory arrest policies grew out of
individual and collective accountability and that the need for heightened accountability resulted from a
96
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Whether endemic to American constitutional design or a manifestation of
judicial apathy, the Supreme Court has stripped away aid for survivors of domestic
violence. In United States v. Morrison,106 the Court concluded that Congress did
not have power under the Commerce Clause107 to enact a civil remedy in the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 that would have allowed victims of gendermotivated violence to bring tort actions against their perpetrators.108
Notwithstanding an abundance of evidence in the congressional record that linked
domestic violence to interstate commerce,109 the Court declined to create a civil
remedy because gender-motivated violence is not an economic activity and “thus
far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of
intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”110 Yet, decided
five years after United States v. Lopez,111 Morrison was only the second time the
Supreme Court rejected a law Congress passed on Commerce Clause grounds after
upholding every other law derived from the congressional power to regulate
interstate commerce between 1937 and 1994.112 In addition, the Court rejected the
argument that Congress could enact the civil remedy as a matter of the Equal
Protection Clause,113 reasoning that regardless of law enforcement’s genderdisparate treatment of domestic violence cases, the Fourteenth Amendment only
applied to state action and the civil remedy was not explicitly designed by Congress
to proscribe discrimination by government actors.114
Under a constitution that requires victims of intimate partner violence to rely
on congressional action for preservation of their basic human rights, the Court’s
decisions in Morrison and Castle Rock represent colossal barriers to meaningful
advances across the whole nation. Following Morrison, only a few states have
taken legislative steps to provide survivors with private remedies against their
perpetrators,115 and the numerous problems associated with progressive lawmaking
legal tradition that allowed husbands to freely rape and beat their wives and to control their bodies,
material resources, and public identity).
106 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2005).
107 The Constitution provides Congress with the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
108 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619.
109 Id. at 628-30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 613 (majority opinion).
111 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (rejecting provision of the federal Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 prohibiting possession of a firearm within a school zone).
112 See Lainie Rutkow et al., Violence Against Women and the U.S. Supreme Court: Recent
Challenges and Opportunities for Advocates and Practitioners, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1248,
1250-51 (2009).
113 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, “[n]o state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
114 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-26 (2005).
115 See Lapidus, supra note 20, at 542 (explaining that as a result of Morrison, the only civil legal
recourse for victims of gender-based violence is through state courts, which frequently minimize
violence against women and typically provide state officials with immunity for failing to protect women
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within every state leave uniform improvements improbable.116 Castle Rock further
complicated the regime of state-by-state domestic violence laws because the Court
found that the word “shall”117 in a state statute still left room for police discretion,
casting a shadow on any legislation that could mandate the enforcement of
restraining orders.118 Furthermore, other potential legislative fixes to address law
enforcement’s inadequate response to domestic violence have been subjected to
strong opposition by local police departments.119
The Court’s belief in a Negative Constitution, in combination with the
continuous unraveling of national domestic violence legislation, has amounted to
government-sanctioned private violence with little hope for improved protection.
Abuse survivors are especially unlikely to benefit from legislative remedies in
states because the experience of victimization compromises participation in
democracy and engenders a process defect in the American political system.120
Without better protection through proper intervention, survivors of domestic
violence are more likely to be passive actors in representative democracy, and
elected officials are less likely to reflect their needs.121 As a result, those for whom
reform would be most vital are the least likely to seriously influence domestic
violence law and policy, and the Negative Constitution elongates victimization to
societal governance in an ongoing cycle of lost chances and silenced voices.122

from violence, and that most women in the United States have no federal or state remedy available to
take civil action against perpetrators or to redress police failure).
116 See Rutkow, supra note 112, at 1254-55 (discussing model state laws that engender the civil
remedy in the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and remarking that “advocates should not
underestimate the challenges associated with getting these laws passed at the state level”).
117 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 752 (2005).
118 See Rutkow, supra note 112, at 1255 (discussing the need for especially careful domestic
violence legislation in the wake of Castle Rock).
119 Id. (noting that legislation to provide survivors with private causes of action for law
enforcement’s disparate treatment of domestic violence cases is likely to face opposition by police
departments).
120 See Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
659, 677 (1979) (suggesting that individuals’ basic needs, including “shelter . . . from the physical and
psychological onslaughts of social debilitation[,]” are “universal, rock-bottom prerequisites of effective
participation in democratic representation”).
121 Justice Harlan Stone sparked widespread discussion about representative defects in the
democratic process when he justified enhanced scrutiny of government action in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), because certain groups are unable to participate effectively
in the political process and politics cannot be trusted with their protection. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1088-89 (1982) (discussing Justice Stone’s
observation and explaining that “[o]ur Constitution assumes that majorities should rule and that the
government should be able to govern” and legislatures should be able to do as they choose without
judicial revocation except when legislative action “cannot be trusted to protect these groups the way it
protects most of us”).
122 See Copelon, supra note 58, at 305 (claiming “domestic violence against women is systemic and
structural, a mechanism of patriarchal control of women that is built upon male superiority and female
inferiority, sex-stereotyped roles and the economic, social and political predominance of men”).
Similarly, much debate has surrounded mandatory arrest practices about the capacity of abuse survivors
to make rational decisions about their own safety. See Miccio, supra note 104, at 241 (explaining the
ideological position on mandatory arrest practices that “battered women are incapable of making a
‘rational’ choice while being traumatized by the violence”).
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This cycle of unfair governance and individual tragedy is characteristic of an
ongoing system of oppression in the United States that stems from the Negative
Constitution. Even when laws are applied equally across the country, Americans
experience legal outcomes and their social consequences in different ways.123
Negative constitutionalism disproportionately disadvantages less resourced
Americans because in the context of government restraint without affirmative
obligations, wealthier individuals are more likely to be able to afford to effectuate
their liberties in the absence of government intervention while individuals without
enough resources cannot attain the same constitutionally guaranteed
entitlements.124 Thus, negative constitutionalism unfairly hinders communities of
color, women, and other lower-resourced populations who might experience
reduced employment options, unequal pay, limited access to education and health
care, or additional systemic barriers to prosperity.125
The Negative Constitution shrouds social injustice and magnifies the
subordination of vulnerable populations. At times, the very perception that
negative rights exist can be damaging to individuals by mediating the
stigmatization of domestic violence survivors and other groups potentially in need
of assistance because even when negative rights never realistically enhance the
individual’s opportunities for constructive change, they create the façade that the
individual has choices and is making bad ones.126 Law does more than regulate
society: it creates society.127 Negative constitutionalism contributes to a nation in
which purportedly universal rights are exercised unequally across socioeconomic
classes, genders, communities, and survivors of abuse.128 Under a Negative
Constitution, rights are not truly guaranteed, and the entitlements of the collectively
disempowered hinge on the moralizing impulses of the social elite.129

123 See NANCY EHRENREICH, THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS READER: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF MOTHERHOOD 1, 3 (Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008) (“[F]ormally equal treatment can
hurt—or help—one group much more than another.”).
124 Cf. id. (describing reproductive rights and explaining that some women may require government
intervention to enjoy the same rights as wealthier women).
125 DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF
LIBERTY 294 (Vintage Books 1997) (“Liberty protects all citizens’ choices from the most direct and
egregious abuses of governmental power, but it does nothing to dismantle social arrangements that make
it impossible for some people to make a choice in the first place.”).
126 See EHRENREICH, supra note 123, at 3-5 (articulating the critical constructivist view that
individual choices are socially constructed and describing choices that are voluntary in name only,
leading to a paradigm in which women are blamed for their own subordination).
127 Id. at 6 (explaining that critical constructivists believe law creates society because law and
behavior are interrelated).
128 Id. at 5 (describing the view that nonintervention by government is most helpful to those with
resources who do not rely on government assistance).
129 Id. at 6 (“[A] critical perspective on the law contends that legal rules frequently serve the needs
and perspectives of those with socioeconomic power in society.”)
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The United States has a long road to travel before it meets the standards in
the Commission’s report.130 Recognition for the persuasive value of international
law in American courts is a realistic starting point in line with longstanding
tradition,131 but a fundamental shift in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence is
necessary to insulate the United States from further damage to its economy,
international reputation, and domestic legitimacy.132
A. Give International Standards Persuasive Value in Domestic Courts
The vast parameters of constitutional interpretation demand judge-made
choices about rules and their application. Legal challenges and outcomes are
unlimited in variety, and the language of the law can be ambiguous.133 While the
role of the judiciary in modern systems of government inescapably depends on
interpretation,134 and even though judges could always find ways to manifest their
personal beliefs during their administration of justice,135 law should err on the side
of human rights by incorporating international standards into the broader milieu of
American legal thought.
Castle Rock represents a case study in how the Court could have untethered
itself from the Negative Constitution and brought the United States into better
compliance with international standards. The circumstances in Castle Rock more
closely resembled Farmer v. Brennan and other exceptions to the Negative
Constitution than they resembled DeShaney because the State limited Jessica’s
capacity to act on her own behalf. The Court could have distinguished Castle Rock
from DeShaney based on the extent of the State’s involvement in each case; while
Jessica repeatedly and directly interacted with the State in Castle Rock and relied
on what she believed was the State’s legally mandated duty to arrest her estranged
husband,136 the State had mere knowledge of the private violence taking place in

130

See discussion supra Part I.
See discussion infra Part II.A.
132 See discussion infra Part II.B.
133 See David M. Beatty, Human Rights and the Rules of Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 6 (David M. Beatty ed., 1994) (positing that legal interpretation
is a subjective task, law is not comprised of self-applying principles or rules, and no words are free from
ambiguity).
134 Id. at 7-8 (arguing that the majority of individuals who study law believe that it has an objective
existence of its own, but they remain “hopelessly divided on virtually all of the most basic issues in
law,” including the role of judges in systems of government, how to “determine when a law is valid and
must be obeyed,” and the difference between law and sociocultural phenomena like morality and
politics).
135 Id. at 7 (describing populist distrust of the judiciary and those who believe that “every judge will
be able to read the law or find some principle or precedent which will allow their personal feelings to
govern the outcome of the case”).
136 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 751-54 (2005).
131
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DeShaney.137 In Castle Rock, the State possessed an affirmative obligation to
respond to Jessica’s cries for help, emanating from its promise to act on Jessica’s
behalf in the restraining order and the legal limits the State places on all citizens’
abilities to defend themselves against systematic acts of harassment and private
violence.138
Once distinguished from DeShaney and other cases within the realm of
negative constitutionalism, the legal analysis in Castle Rock falls apart. As Justice
Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the statute giving rise to the restraining order at
issue in Castle Rock was intended to mandate police enforcement,139 an order of
protection is issued to benefit the specific holder of the order,140 and the Court had
already recognized various nontraditional property rights in other cases, including
property without specific monetary value that indirectly benefited its owner.141 It
necessarily followed that the State violated Jessica’s constitutional rights because
no one on the Court contested that if Jessica had a property interest, then Castle
Rock’s deprivation of Jessica’s interest was in violation of the Due Process
Clause.142
Moreover, the Court should have considered elements of international
standards for human rights throughout its process of contemplation. While the
Court greatly weighted the importance of police discretion,143 it should have also
valued the vital impact of unchecked police discretion on each domestic violence
survivor’s right to life.144 Additionally, the Court should have more thoroughly
assessed the human tragedy that led to the proceedings; the deaths of Jessica’s
children were not irrelevant to Jessica’s rights but rather ineradicable consequences
of a society that does not take affirmative measures to protect children or other
vulnerable populations or to preserve women’s equal protection before the law.145

137

See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191-92 (1989).
Id. at 199-200.
139 Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 779-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 786-89.
141 Id. at 789-90. In particular, Justice Stevens pointed to the Court’s recognition of property rights
in welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), disability benefits, Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), public education, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), utility services, Memphis
Lights, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978), and government employment, Cleveland Bd. Of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), as well as other entitlements that challenge traditional
classification as property, including revocation of a driver’s license pending the adjudication of an
accident, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 532 (1971), and claims before a state commission that had been
arbitrarily denied, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). Town of Castle Rock, 545
U.S. at 789-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 774 (2005).
143 Id. at 761-62 (majority opinion) (discussing the “deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement
discretion, even in the presence of seemingly mandatory legislative commands” and “the practical
necessity for discretion”).
144 See Report, supra note 18, at 30 (“Various international human rights bodies have moreover
considered State failures in the realm of domestic violence not only discriminatory, but also violations to
the right to life of women.”).
145 Id. at 30-31 (observing that “international and regional systems have pronounced on the strong
link between discrimination, violence and due diligence, emphasizing that a State’s failure to act with
138
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These considerations need not have been determinative, but should have been at
least persuasive. This would have been in line with the Castle Rock Court’s
reliance on legal articles146 as well as the Court’s inspection of international
standards for the treatment of sexual minorities in Lawrence v. Texas147 and its
recognition that other countries’ experiences with emergency power “may not be
irrelevant” in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.148
As a further example, Roper v. Simmons149 was another case that highlighted
the practicability and enduring importance of international human rights standards
in American jurisprudence. In 2005, the Roper Court considered whether the
execution of a juvenile who was older than fifteen but younger than eighteen when
he committed a capital crime was constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.150
The Court had previously divided narrowly around the question before allowing
executions to continue,151 but found a new reason to uproot its old decision that the
death penalty was not disproportionate punishment for offenders under eighteen “in
the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world that
continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”152 Although
Justice Scalia criticized the Court’s respect for international laws in his dissent,153
both Justice Kennedy154 writing for the majority and Justice O’Connor155 in her
dissent registered positive impressions about the congruence between domestic and
international laws, fostering the potential for persuasive treatment of international
laws in courtrooms across the United States.
Other countries have continuously demonstrated this degree of respect for
foreign law—especially American law—and it is becoming necessary for American
courts to maintain cognizance of developments outside the United States in order to
meaningfully participate in a globalized society. Undoubtedly, countries differ and
the world’s constitutions are not identical, but the United States has greatly

due diligence to protect women from violence constitutes a form of discrimination, and denies women
their right to equality before the law,[]” and remarking that protection is particularly important for “girlchildren”).
146 Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 763, 766.
147 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73, 576-77 (2003) (discussing British law and the
findings of the European Court of Human Rights in considering the constitutionality of Texas’ antisodomy law).
148 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 651 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(contemplating whether President Truman’s actions were constitutional when he directed the Secretary
of Commerce to take possession of the country’s steel mills).
149 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
150 Id. at 555-56.
151 Id. at 556.
152 Id. at 575.
153 Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American
law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”).
154 Id. at 578 (majority opinion) (“The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”).
155 Id. at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (proclaiming that the Court “should not be surprised to find
congruence between domestic and international values”).
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influenced other nations’ constitutions and the decisions of foreign courts.156
Much of international law is not such a significant departure from American
standards that it is unwieldy in American courtrooms.157 Moreover, the application
of foreign law in non-American, domestic courtrooms is increasingly common, and
a more international perspective is essential for the United States to maintain
political, economic, ethical, and social traction in a progressively globalized
world.158
Fortunately, measured contemplation of human rights has already informed
American jurisprudence for centuries. Similar to the international principle that
rights are inherent rather than bestowed by government,159 the generation of the
Constitution’s framers believed in a higher law protecting natural rights that could
not have been entirely codified in a written document.160 Subsequently,
understanding law through the lens of humanistic traditions such as natural law
theory and the European Enlightenment became a dominant component of legal
education in the United States.161 Recognition of natural law has received great
credit and criticism over the centuries, and this debate is perhaps best epitomized
by the dispute between Justice Chase and Justice Iredell in Calder v. Bull,162 in
which the justices debated whether legislatures should be bound as a matter of
natural justice flowing from general principles of law and reason or if judicial
review should be cabined by the plain language of the Constitution such that the
mechanics of the Constitution’s writing would predominate over policy, belief, or
function.163

156 See Justice Michael Kirby, International Law—The Impact on National Constitutions, 21 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 327, 348 (2006) (acknowledging that international legal sources must be confined in the
United States due to differences in constitutional provisions and societies, but international law must not
be ignored in light of the United States’ influence on other nation’s constitutions and judicial
developments).
157 See id.
158 See id. at 329 (commenting that by “[d]rawing upon sources found in international law, not as
binding rules but as contextual principles” and in light of the values, ethics, politics, and economics of
globalization, “judges of municipal courts in this century will assume an important function in making
the principles of international law a reality throughout the world”).
159 See Glendon, supra note 30, at 1164.
160 See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 715-16
(1975) (“For the generation that framed the Constitution, the concept of a ‘higher law,’ protecting
‘natural rights,’ and taking precedence over ordinary positive law as a matter of political obligation, was
widely shared and deeply felt. An essential element of American constitutionalism was the reduction to
written form—and hence to positive law—of some of the principles of natural rights.”).
161 See Mark Warren Bailey, Early Legal Education in the United States: Natural Law Theory and
Law as a Moral Science, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 316 (1998) (explaining that “[T]he ideals of legal
education in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries placed the science of law squarely within
the broad humanistic traditions of natural law theory and the eighteenth-century European
Enlightenment”).
162 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
163 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75-76 (6th ed. 2009) (presenting the
conflict between Justice Iredell and Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull and remarking that “[T]he dispute
between Justice Chase and Justice Iredell has proved fundamental to constitutional law”).
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Unlike the natural law approach, recognition of international standards would
broaden the scope of judges’ contemplation without granting them the authority to
make individual judgment calls about what constitutes a natural right. Like
electorally accountable decision-makers,164 judges frequently confront
controversial issues by reflecting on pre-established moral conventions.165 An
international approach does not give rise to the same potential pitfalls as natural
law because the approach does not assume a specific, predetermined solution in any
given context but rather asks judges to consider international norms and agreements
in the larger process of reaching decisions.166 This consideration should not
embody citation to conveniently supportive foreign decisions167 but instead take
the form of serious contemplation of plausibly related legal decisions in contexts
where outcomes are not firmly rooted in uncontroversial precedents.168
Ultimately, accounting for international standards for domestic violence
constitutes legal realism. Based on the belief that “our government is not a
government of laws[], but one of laws through men[,]”169 early legal realists
argued that available sources of law would not always guide reasonable judges to
only one outcome.170 In recent years, a new generation of legal realists has
emerged and combined legal theory and empirical research to improve law and
policy.171 Sometimes labeled “legal empiricism,”172 new legal realism refers to a
variety of interdisciplinary inquiries173 that ultimately erode the delineation
164 See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 100-01 (1982)
(remarking that electorally accountable policymakers are not well suited to deal with controversial
developments “in a way that is faithful to the notion of moral evolution,” relying instead on “established
moral conventions”).
165 See Grey, supra note 160, at 705 (arguing that courts “appropriately apply values not articulated
in the constitutional text, and appropriately apply them in determining the constitutionality of
legislation”).
166 See STONE, supra note 163, at 77 (questioning whether the function of natural law in American
jurisprudence is flawed because it inevitably depends on “. . . an unwarranted belief in the possibility of
“right answers”“).
167 See Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 86-87 (2005)
(describing the complicated environments of foreign decisions to which the American judiciary is
“largely ignorant” and arguing that reliance on these decisions as precedents “is indeed to flirt with the
idea of universal natural law, or, what amounts to almost the same thing, to suppose fantastically that the
world’s judges constitute a single, elite community of wisdom and conscience”).
168 See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119
HARV. L. REV. 109, 116 (2005) (asserting that other countries’ approaches may provide empirical
information in judicial decisions when more than one interpretation is possible from domestic sources).
169 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1222, 1243 (1931).
170 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 832
(2008) (reflecting on the early movement of legal realists as a reaction to the formalist view that law
mechanically determined outcomes of particular cases and describing the belief that “existing law did
not compel particular outcomes” and that “available sources would not require a rational and fairminded judge to reach only one result”).
171 See Howard Erlanger et al., Is it Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 337
(2005).
172 See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial
Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 822 (2002).
173 See Erlanger, supra note 171, at 337-38.

SIEGEL Formatted (DO NOT DELETE)

746

CARDOZO JOURNAL OF LAW & GENDER

4/16/2012 10:08 AM

[Vol. 18:727

between law and political science in modern American jurisprudence.174 The work
of new legal realists has focused on the personality of judicial decision makers and
systematically examined how institutions and individuals respond distinctively to
the stimuli of different cases.175 As a result, new legal realists have leveraged
statistical analyses to illustrate the significant impact of judges’ political affiliation,
ideology, race, sex, and other personal characteristics on legal outcomes.176
Giving international law persuasive force in domestic proceedings could
counteract unfair influences in the judicial process. As Ronald Dworkin famously
theorized, judges must always to some extent fit and justify their decisions, and the
factors underlying legal outcomes are generally cabined by the potential for appeal
and the necessity of maintaining institutional legitimacy.177
Enhanced
consideration for international human rights standards flows naturally from this
context because it is increasingly apparent that American law is not algorithmic and
that judges could benefit from increased external guidance.178 Thus, international
law could provide much-needed balance in an era of growing awareness about the
impact of judges’ personal characteristics on legal outcomes and the serious
consequences of the bench’s idiosyncrasies in the lives of abuse survivors.179
B. Reject the Negative Constitution
Increasing the persuasive value of international standards in American
courtrooms is a realistic mechanism for improving the United States’ compliance
with global human rights law,180 but it is the first among many steps toward
rectifying the deeper failure of the State to adequately respond to domestic
violence. There are no quick fixes that would immediately and everlastingly secure
the adequate protection of human rights in the United States.181 If the Supreme
Court ever backs away from the amplified version of the Negative Constitution that
it applied in Castle Rock,182 it would have another important decision to make:
174 See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 170, at 834 (arguing that “[M]uch of the emerging empirical
work on judicial behavior is best understood as a new generation of legal realism” and that large-scale
studies of judicial personality “will erode the distinctions between ‘law and politics’ political science
and ‘empirical legal studies’”).
175 Id. at 834-35.
176 Id. at 836-41.
177 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 254-58 (Harv. Univ. Press 1986).
178 See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 170, at 844 (noting that political convictions are only a partial
predictor of judicial outcomes and that law is a constraining force in judicial decision making).
179 Id. at 851 (contemplating remedies to judicial bias such as mandatory diversity in the judiciary
and recognizing that sometimes knowledge provides protection and enhanced judicial awareness could
improve outcomes).
180 See discussion supra Part II.A.
181 See Lapidus, supra note 20, at 554 (describing improvements to the United States’ response to
domestic violence that “will not come easily or quickly, especially given the United States government’s
often-espoused disdain for international human rights mechanisms”).
182 See, e.g., Miccio, supra note 103, at 300 (asserting that while DeShaney was problematic for
various reasons, in it, the Court did not insert the negative rights interpretation of the Constitution to the
exclusion of the people’s voice like it did in Castle Rock because in DeShaney, Wisconsin had not
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whether to decisively renounce its violations of international standards by giving
fair balance to domestic violence survivors’ human rights or to preserve the State’s
opportunity to avoid its responsibilities for another day by leaving the mantle of
DeShaney intact.183 Only through renouncing DeShaney and the other cases in
which it denied a constitutional right to intervention and by adopting affirmative
measures as a nationwide approach to the State’s response to domestic violence
could the United States curtail the various destructive consequences of its
noncompliance with international standards, including the economic and
reputational damage that arise from its human rights violations and the depreciative
impact of domestic violence on the expressive value of the Constitution.184
The harmful economic consequences of domestic violence are both
immediate and long lasting. Justice Souter made this clear during his dissent in
Morrison when he reviewed the mountain of data about the enormous financial
impact of violence against women available in VAWA’s congressional record.185
Between five and ten billion dollars are spent in the United States each year on
“health care, criminal justice, and other social costs of domestic violence.”186
Additional partial estimates show violent crime against women generates at least
three billion dollars in annual national expenses.187
This financial upshot is both individually devastating and widely significant
to the broader community. Domestic violence transforms the function of women
and girls in daily life, diminishing women’s contributions in the workplace and
weaving domination through every aspect of society.188 Moreover, domestic
violence is an expensive public health concern; abuse survivors experience
heightened levels of mental and physical health problems, contributing to an
increased demand for medical and mental health care services and a simultaneous
decline in productivity.189 Beyond its potential to cause permanent disability and
death, domestic violence drains health care and social service resources and

enacted legislation to mandate specific outcomes from the police or Child Protective Services such as a
mandatory arrest provision).
183 See MacNaughton, supra note 16, at 752 (asserting that recognition for positive rights is
plausible and legitimate based on theoretical sources of law like deontology and consequentialism and
that DeShaney’s effects on constitutional law “has deformed the development of the law and has led
judges to rely on formalistic logic games rather than real principles of justice”).
184 This Essay focuses on the financial, political, and expressive ramifications of the United States’
noncompliance with international standards for human rights, but an exhaustive list of the consequences
of domestic violence would be far more extensive. See, e.g., Miccio, supra note 104, at 305-08
(describing various socioeconomic costs associated with intimate partner violence).
185 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 630-33 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 632.
187 Id.
188 See Charlotte Bunch, Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights,
12 HUM. RTS. Q. 486, 490-91 (1990) (stating that violence against women is a political act: its message
is “stay in your place or be afraid”).
189 Wendy Max et al., The Economic Toll of Intimate Partner Violence Against Women in the
United States, 19 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 259, 259-60 (2004).
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negatively affects coworkers, friends, relatives, and potentially anyone else in a
survivor’s life.190
Beyond the financial ramifications of domestic violence, the United States
has reputational incentives to comply with international standards for human rights.
In addition to the judiciary’s effective disregard for survivors of domestic
violence,191 the country’s failure to participate in international efforts to end
violence against women is a result of various elements of society and the
conceptual complications inherent in the globalization of law and policy, including
the challenge of pluralism underlying worldwide support for specific intrinsic
values associated with being human192 and the disconnect between American
human rights activists and domestic violence advocates.193 Regardless of the
various external and internal situational factors affecting the United States’
response, it is the responsibility of the country’s government to improve its
compliance with international standards for human rights and exhibit the same
concern for its reputation in the domestic violence context that it has repeatedly
shown in the course of military action.194 The United States’ international
reputation plays an unavoidable role in its future place in the world, and it has a
dramatic impact on its national security, the success of its humanitarian efforts, its
political credibility, and the strength of its markets.195
The Commission’s decision in Castle Rock highlighted human rights
violations in a nation that has been repeatedly put on notice about its inadequate
treatment of women.196 Similar to the Commission’s findings that the country’s

190

Id. at 260.
See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
192 For a more thorough treatment of why domestic violence and other human rights initiatives
might lack traction within the United States, see Sally Engle Merry & Jessica Shimmin, The Curious
Resistance to Seeing Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Violation in the United States, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM, 113, 113-14 (Shareen Hertal & Kathryn
Libal eds., 2011) (explaining that successful global initiatives led by Americans to address violence
against women have not had much impact on the American movement against domestic violence
because human rights activists in the United States are focused on the experiences of individuals in other
countries and domestic violence advocates have adopted the neoliberal ideal that American survivors
should take responsibility for themselves).
193 See C. Scott Pryor, Looking for Bedrock: Accounting for Human Rights in Classical Liberalism,
Modern Secularism, and the Christian Tradition, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 609, 610 (2011) (arguing that
“consensus on new human rights is increasingly difficult” because human rights theories derived from
“historical, moral, and theological conceptions of life” are not universally palatable due to pluralism, but
offering Christian doctrines as an example of how candid discussions about religious traditions could
prove helpful to efforts to universalize human rights).
194 JONATHAN MERCER, REPUTATION & INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 19-20 (1996) (discussing the
various occasions that the United States has allowed its reputation to influence its nuclear strategy and
military interventions).
195 Id. at 3-5 (exploring the ramifications of the United States’ international reputation).
196 See Lapidus, supra note 20, at 554 (analyzing the influence of international law on the United
States and concluding that “pressure mounts from all sides, and from several separate international
human rights mechanisms, for the United States to reform its policies so as to protect women from
domestic and gender-based violence”).
191
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human rights deprivations were multifaceted and ongoing,197 the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination has registered concerns in its official capacity
under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination198 about the insufficient response among American authorities to
violence and abuse against minority women, which deprives them “of their right to
access to justice and the right to obtain adequate reparation or satisfaction for
damages suffered.”199 Elsewhere, as with the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,200 the United States has averted
violations of international treaties by simply refusing to ratify them, although not
without disapproval from the global community.201
But even if the United States ratified and enforced every relevant treaty and
facilitated civil remedies across the country, a fundamental shift in constitutional
interpretation would remain necessary to neutralize the moral fallout of domestic
violence and restore principle to the United States. In an article he published
before joining the Supreme Court, Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia observed the
bidirectional relationship between the Constitution and morality:
One would be foolish to deny the relevance of moral perceptions to law.
Society’s moral beliefs necessarily affect its constitutional perceptions in
general and its perceptions of what economic rights are protected by its
constitution in particular. There is no need to apologize for the
phenomenon, even when the moral beliefs spring from a theological belief.
In any case, it is useless to rail against the phenomenon because it is
inevitable.202

By enshrining liberties and documenting society’s most prized values, the
Constitution of the United States is more than descriptive of a system of
government or ground rules for civilization but also aspirational and expressive of
the nation’s ideals.203 In its current incarnation, this country is comprised of local,
197

See discussion supra Part I.A.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX),
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965). This convention, signed by the United States in 1966 and ratified in
1994, prohibits racial discrimination and requires the State to report on the intersection of race and
gender. See Lapidus, supra note 20, at 545 (explaining the purposes of the convention and the activities
required of the United States).
199 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, at 8, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/Co/6 (Feb.
2008), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/CERDConcludingComments2008.pdf.
200 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
201 See Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 389, 397 (2008) (explaining that despite politically palatable explanations,
“critical attention is often focused on the U.S. failure to ratify certain internationally popular treaties,
including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the American Convention on Human Rights, and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)”).
202 Antonin Scalia, Morality, Pragmatism and the Legal Order, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 123,
123 (1986).
203 Michael C. Dorf, The Living Constitution and Future Generations: The Aspirational
198
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state, and federal governments with the power to subordinate the rights of
individuals in the name of public health and safety while simultaneously
maintaining extremely limited affirmative obligations to actually ensure individual
health and safety.204 This conceptualization of governance is unbalanced and
evades fundamental notions of fairness, favoring constitutional formalism over
approaches to statehood that accord with human rights principles.205 In addition, it
disproportionately penalizes minorities and otherwise politically disempowered
groups that cannot incite government accountability through democratic processes
despite plain constitutional language purporting to guarantee equal protection
before the law.206
The individual must have a right to government intervention in cases of
domestic violence. Strengthening rights-based approaches to government enhances
the public’s perceived legitimacy of institutions,207 and the Constitution should
accommodate the positive obligation of government protection in light of citizens’
persistent expectations that government obligations constitute a normative right and
that the government has a duty to protect the public.208 Constitutional
requirements for affirmative measures like mandatory arrest provisions are
especially vital in the domestic violence context because they demand affirmative
measures from a government that once sanctioned violence against women.209
Thus, affirmative measures that preserve fundamental human rights are not just the
international standard for State conduct; rather, the government’s responsibilities to
prevent and respond to domestic violence are American values of constitutional
import.
CONCLUSION
In its current form, the American response to domestic violence is a troubling
violation of international standards for human rights. Now that Castle Rock has
been acknowledged as an injustice on the world’s stage, Jessica has given the
country the guidance it needs in the Commission’s report to improve the State’s
response and move toward compliance with international laws.210 Progress
Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631, 1631 (2009).
204 See supra notes 70-89 and accompanying text.
205 For a deeper examination of the contrast between constitutional formalism and functionalism,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of
Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21 (1998).
206 See supra notes 116-125 and accompanying text.
207 See Beatty, supra note 133, at 3 (observing that bills of rights have long been associated with
government legitimacy).
208 See generally Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991) (detailing the historical origins and continuing power
of the fundamental principle that the government has a duty to protect).
209 See Miccio, supra note 104, at 240 (“One must not overlook the radical and beneficial nature of
mandatory arrest provisions: They placed male intimate violence at the center of law enforcement policy
by criminalizing conduct that the justice system and society previously had sanctioned.”).
210 See discussion supra Part I.A.
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requires an entirely new understanding of the realities of surviving abuse,211 but
treating global standards as persuasive in American courts is a feasible starting
point.212 The United States’ reputation, financial health, and legitimacy demand
reform, warranting a clean break from negative constitutionalism in favor of
internationally acceptable affirmative measures to protect human rights.

211
212

See discussion supra Part I.B.
See discussion supra Part II.A.

